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Sentencing is widely viewed as an objective and scientific exercise, whilst emotions 
have long been regarded as a danger to the rationality of the legal realm. For that 
reason, emotions have traditionally been kept at arm’s length from the sentencing 
exercise. However, the last two decades have witnessed something of an 
‘emotionalisation’ of law and criminal justice. It is now widely contended that 
emotions may enrich our justice system through bolstering therapeutic jurisprudence, 
procedural justice, through the quality of decision-making and may even transform 
relationships between victims and offenders. A number of mechanisms have been 
developed in recent years which provide victims and offenders with limited means to 
express their emotions to the court and these may be taken into account as part of the 
sentencing exercise.  Whilst these developments are broadly welcomed, the authors 
question the overall capacity of criminal courts rooted in a retributive tradition to 
enrich justice through a better understanding of human emotions.  
Introduction 
 
The place of emotions in the criminal justice system is defined by a curious 
paradox. On the one hand, law is imbued with emotion. The criminal law, in 
particular, is replete with numerous examples of trials concerning crimes of 
passion, episodes of provocation and inquiries into the general state of mind 
of the offender.1 The existence, absence or extent of emotions such as anger, 
passion, fear, or extreme distress on the part of the accused may well 
determine the applicability of various defences, such as the loss of control 
(formerly provocation), diminished responsibility, duress or self-defence. 
Magistrates, judges and juries are routinely faced with facts that will inevitably 
trigger emotional responses including anger, disgust, moral outrage and 
compassion.2 The collapse of the public/private divide has permitted the 
penetration of emotions into the public space,3 where they have become 
popular currency in an era of “new punitiveness” and “moral panics”.4 The 
                                            
1
 S Karstedt, “Emotions and criminal justice” (2002) 6 Theoretical Criminology 299. 
2
 See further T A Maroney, “Emotional Regulation and Judicial Behavior” (2011) 99 California 
Law Review 1481. 
3
 J Brewer, “Dealing with Emotions in Peacemaking” in S Karstedt, I Loader and H Strang 
(eds),Emotions, Crime and Justice (Oxford: Hart, 2011). 
4
 See generally, J Pratt, D Brown, M Brown, S Hallworth and W Morrison (eds.), The New 
Punitiveness: Trends, Theories, Perspectives (Cullompton: Willan, 2005).  
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increasing tendency to adopt public shaming rituals as part of community-
based sentences (such as public works whilst wearing orange jumpsuits) are 
designed in part to assuage public anger whilst simultaneously triggering   
shame on the part of the offender.5 
 
On the other hand, the imprecision and volatility of emotions pose a direct 
challenge to the presumed rational and measurable nature of the legal realm. 
In a lawyer-driven system underpinned by adversarial confrontation, there is 
little room for empathy, or any form of enquiry into emotions other than those 
which the law deems to be relevant. As Bandes contends, “the passion for 
predictability, the zeal to prosecute, and mechanisms, such as distancing, 
repressing and isolating one’s feelings from one’s thought processes are the 
emotional stances that have always driven mainstream legal thought.”6 The 
fear that victims, witnesses, defendants, lawyers and judges might be 
anything other than rational actors pervades the law in general7 and 
sentencing process in particular.8 In leaving the door ajar for emotions that 
are traditionally alien to legal discourse, it is feared that its core normative 
features of consistency, certainty and fairness would be lost in a maelstrom of 
emotional outpourings. Emotions of anger, hatred and pain – or indeed of 
sorrow, understanding and forgiveness - may translate into undue 
punitiveness or leniency and thereby compromise the normative objectivity of 
the law. This aversion to emotion is reflected in the structures and processes 
and magnetises its governance. As such, emotions tend to “creep in 
interstitially, as indicators that individual defendants are less bad and so need 
less deterrence, incapacitation, or retribution.”9 Remorse, for example, may 
be directly linked to rehabilitation, insofar as that an offender who realises that 
his / her actions were wrong is less likely to repeat them in the future. In this 
way, remorse may also serve to reinforce social norms, denounce public 
wrongs, and thus contribute to deterrence in the longer run.10 
 
Yet recent years have seen a marked reduction in scepticism toward 
emotions. Emotions have come to feature prominently in late modernity, with 
                                            
5
 See further D Kahan, “What”s Really Wrong with Shaming Sanctions” (2006) 84 Texas Law 
Review 2075; T Massaro, “Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law” (1991) 89 Michigan 
Law Review 1880; “The Meanings of Shame: Implications for Legal Reform” (1997) 3/4 
Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 645; M Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity. Disgust, 
Shame and the Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); J Pratt, “Emotive and 
ostentatious punishment: Its decline and resurgence in modern society” (2000) 2 Punishment 
& Society 417; J Whitman, “What is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?” (1998) 107 Yale 
Law Journal 1062. Though shaming need not be used in a stigmatic way, but – if properly 
instituted – carries reintegrative potential: see generally J Braithwaite, Crime, Shame and 
Reintegration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
6
 S Bandes, “Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements” (1996) 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
361, p. 369. 
7
 S Bandes, “Introduction” in S Bandes (ed), The Passions of Law (New York: New York 
University Press, 1999). 
8
 See eg DJ Hall, ‘Victims’ Voices in Criminal Court: The Need for Restraint’ (1991) 28 
American Criminal Law Review 233; Y Buruma, ‘Doubts on the Upsurge of the Victim’s Role 
in Criminal Law’ in H Kaptein and M Malsch (eds.), Crime, Victims, and Justice, Essays on 
Principles and Practice (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004). 
9
 S Bibas and R A Bierschbach, “Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal Procedure” 
(2004) 114 Yale Law Journal 85, p. 88. 
10
 Ibid. 
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heightened emotional awareness is increasingly viewed as quintessentially a 
“good thing”, comprising “a critical source of information for problem-solving 
and learning”.11 A greater awareness of emotions should enable institutions 
and decision-makers within them to better predict when negative sentiments 
may arise and how best to dissipate them.12 In doing so, institutions can 
become better placed to adapt their procedures in such a way so as to 
perform a more effective regulatory role whilst simultaneously building 
confidence among the public.13 
 
In a widely cited 2002 presidential address to the American Society of 
Criminology, Lawrence Sherman called for an “emotionally intelligent” 
approach to criminal justice,14 “in which the central tools will be inventions for 
helping offenders, victims, communities, and officials manage each other’s 
emotions to minimize harm.”15 Under this paradigm, the state itself would 
adopt a rational stance in dealing with the emotions of victims, offenders and 
communities in order to persuade citizens to comply with the law and repair 
any harm caused.16 Sherman envisages such a system working “like an 
emotionally intelligent political campaign or product marketing plan, one that is 
likely to employ disaggregated strategies based on research evidence about 
what messages or methods work best for each type of audience.”17  
 
This article draws on Sherman’s vision, and examines the place of emotions 
within the law and practice of sentencing within England and Wales. In a 
sense, sentencing can be viewed as the apogee of the criminal process; it is 
at this juncture that the aims of punishment are given concrete and public 
expression.18 We begin by exploring in depth why emotions matter, and, in 
particular, the benefits that a more emotionally-intelligent approach to 
sentencing might reap. Next, we consider a number of legal and policy 
developments that have arguably increased the place of emotion in 
                                            
11
 William J. Long and Peter Breke, War and Reconciliation: Reason and Emotion in Conflict 
(MIT Press, Boston, 2003), p. 127. 
12
 K Murphy, ‘Procedural Justice, Emotions and Resistance to Authority’ in Karstedt et al, n. 3 
above. 
13
 See generally D D Welch, “Ruling With the Heart: Emotion-Based Public Policy” (1997) 6 
Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 55. 
14
 L Sherman, “Reason for Emotion: Reinventing Justice with Theories, Innovations, and 
Research — The American Society of Criminology 2002 Presidential Address” (2003) 41 
Criminology 1. The concept of emotional intelligence itself is generally attributed to Howard 
Gardner, who proposed an alternative concept of multiple intelligences, which included both 
interpersonal intelligence (our capacity to understand the feelings and motivations of other 
people) and intrapersonal intelligence (our capacity to understand our feelings, our wants and 
fears, our strengths and weaknesses, and motivations and goals): H Gardner, Frames of 
Mind: The Theory of Multiple Intelligences (New York: Basic Books, 1983). Debate continues 
as to the precise definition of emotional intelligence, and indeed whether it is a useful concept 
at all given the lack of consensus as to what constitutes an ‘emotion’ as opposed to a mood, 
affect, feeling, cognition, temperament or personality: see generally R Plutchik, “The Nature of 
Emotions” (2001) 89 American Scientist 344. 
15
 Sherman, “Reason for Emotion”, ibid, p. 6.  
16
 Ibid., 8. 
17
 Ibid, citing D. Massey, ‘Presidential Address. A Brief History of Human Society: The Origin 
and Role of Emotion in Social Life’ (2002) 67 American Sociological Review 1. 
18
 R Henham, Sentencing and the Legitimacy of Trial Justice (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), p. 
1. 
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sentencing; particular attention is given to pleas in mitigation and the 
reception of victim impact evidence. Finally, we move on to evaluate the 
overall role of emotion within the sentencing framework of England and Wales 
and proceed to make a number of suggestions to unlock the full potential 
benefit of emotions. 
The Importance of Emotional Narratives 
 
An emotionally intelligent approach as advocated by Sherman would require 
us to ascertain how its primary participants – victims, offenders and legal 
actors - think and interact using both their emotional and rational brains.19 Law 
and policy would evolve in light of what we learn about the emotional 
responses of victims, offenders and the community. In particular, we contend 
that such an approach holds the potential to reap four significant benefits to 
the sentencing process: (1) strengthening therapeutic jurisprudence; (2) 
strengthening procedural justice; (3) improving the quality of decision-making; 
and, finally (4), the transformation of relationships. 
 
 
(1) Strengthening Therapeutic Justice 
 
Perhaps the most commonly cited advantage of an emotionally-intelligent 
approach to sentencing is the potential for therapeutic benefit. There is 
considerable overlap between emotional intelligence and therapeutic 
jurisprudence discourse. Therapeutic jurisprudence posits that lawyers and 
policymakers can seek to reduce anti-therapeutic aspects of the legal 
process, whilst simultaneously enhancing its therapeutic effects by studying 
the emotions and psychological experiences of victims and offenders.20 While 
lawyers cannot be expected to act as therapists, and trials cannot provide a 
substitute for psychological interventions, therapeutic jurisprudence contends 
that justice processes, and their key players, hold the potential to operate as 
‘change agents’ whereby victims and witnesses are offered respect and space 
to tell their story and air their emotions.21  
 
As far as victims are concerned, their emotions are likely to vary according to 
the types of crimes committed, the levels of injury / loss experienced, and the 
diverse life experiences of individuals as well as the inherent characteristics.22  
Bearing this in mind, care should be taken in navigating a minefield of 
literature that can be at times prone to adopting generalist and vague 
concepts such as “emotional redress / restoration”, “closure”, “healing”, 
                                            
19
 Massey, "A Brief History”, n. 17 above.   
20
 B Winick, “The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence” in D Wexler and B Winick. 
Law in a Therapeutic Key: Developments in Therapeutic Jurisprudence (Durham, NC: 
Carolina Academic Press, 1996).  
21
 D Wexler, “Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Rehabilitative Role of the Criminal Defense 
Lawyer” (2005) 17 St. Thomas Law Review 743, p. 748. 
22
 See generally J Shapland and M Hall, “What do we know about the effects of crime on 
victims?” (2007) 14 International Review of Victimology 175. 
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“catharsis”, etc. without defining what is specifically meant.23 Even if emotional 
expression does lead to such phenomena, it should not be assumed that 
feelings of closure or catharsis expressed in the aftermath of a criminal 
hearing will necessarily have any longer-term bearing on clinical diagnoses 
such as depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress or recognised psychiatric 
disorders.  
 
However, evidence does suggest that overcoming negative emotions 
resonates closely with evidence-based strategies to deal with states of 
distress. There is now a robust body of empirical evidence suggesting that 
externalizing traumatic experiences through verbalization can be an effective 
intervention for many people facing major life-changing events, including 
violent crime.24 Such verbalisation – which is the lynchpin of contemporary 
counselling and psychotherapy - can help reduce feelings of anger, anxiety 
and depression;25 bolster self-confidence;26 and even improve physical 
health.27 By pinpointing the therapeutic effect through more specific and 
evidence-based terminology, some of the pitfalls associated with altogether 
grander claims about the capacity of the criminal justice system to effect 
“closure” or “catharsis” for victims can be avoided.28 
 
Although the highly-fragmented nature of story-telling that takes place within 
the trial is vastly different from the comparatively free-flowing and client-
focused nature of most talking therapies,29 there is evidence that victim impact 
statements can give certain victims a sense of confidence and control, which 
can also serve to reduce feelings of anger and retribution.30 As Erez has 
argued, “[t]he cumulative knowledge acquired from research in various 
jurisdictions, in countries with different legal systems, suggests that victims 
                                            
23
 See further A Pemberton & S Reynaers, “The Controversial Nature of Victim Participation: 
Therapeutic Benefits in Victim Impact Statements” in E Erez, M Kilchling and J Wemmers 
(eds), Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Victim Participation in Justice (Durham, NC: Carolina 
Academic Press, 2011). 
24
 J Smyth and J Pennebaker, “Sharing One”s Story: Translating Emotional Experiences Into 
Words As A Coping Tool” in C. Snyder (ed.), Coping: The Psychology Of What Works, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); J.Kenney, “Gender roles and grief cycles: 
Observations of models of grief and coping in homicide survivors” (2003) 10 International 
Review of Victimology 19; M White, Narrative Means to Therapeutic Ends (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Co, 1990). A 2005 study by Zech and Rime did, however, suggest that some of 
these benefits may be perceived rather than real: E Zech and B Rime, “Is talking about an 
emotional experience helpful? Effects on emotional recovery and perceived benefits.” (2005) 
12 Clinical Psychology & Psychotherapy 270. 
25
 T Orbuch, J Harvey, S Davis, and N Merbach, “Account-Making and Confiding as Acts of 
Meaning in Response to Sexual Assault” (1004) 9 Journal of Family Violence 249. 
26
 J Koenig Kellas and V Manusov, “What”s in a story? The relationship between narrative 
completeness and tellers” adjustment to relationship dissolution” (2003) 20 Journal of Social 
and Personal Relationships 285. 
27
 R Enright and R Fitzgibbons, Helping clients forgive: An empirical guide for resolving anger 
and restoring hope (Washington D.C: American Psychological Association, 2000). 
28
 Pemberton and Reynaers, “The Controversial Nature”, n. 23 above. 
29
 See generally C Feltham, What Is Counselling? The Promise and Problem of the Talking 
Therapies (Sage, London, 1995). 
30
 J C Karremans and P Van Lange, “Does activating justice help or hurt in promoting 
forgiveness?” (2005) 41 Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 290; H Strang, Repair or 
Revenge? Victims and Restorative Justice (Oxford: Clarendon, 2002). 
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often benefit from participation and input. With proper safeguards, the overall 
experience of providing input can be positive and empowering.”31 By the same 
token, however, it ought to be borne in mind that such therapeutic effects will 
not be universally experienced by all victims; and indeed there is some 
evidence that while participation may help victim recovery in certain cases, it 
may hinder it in others.32  
 
A further therapeutic benefit for the victim may result from the offender 
expressing remorse or offering an apology. Although there is strong empirical 
evidence to suggest that victims desire apologies and feel better in their 
aftermath,33 there is also an obvious risk that some expressions of remorse 
will be feigned in order to secure a lighter sentence.  Yet, as Bibas and 
Bierschbach contend, even false or half-hearted expressions of remorse are 
better than none at all these may still help  victims to feel vindicated and may 
ultimately lead offenders to internalise the awareness that they ought to feel 
remorse after a period of time.34  
 
While the most obvious therapeutic benefits of participation may be self-
evident in the case of victims, offenders may also benefit in a similar way.  
Although there is a dearth of empirical evidence as to the precise nature of 
offender emotions in the sentencing process,35 the literature is replete with 
references to anger, resentment, hatred, anxiety, depression, remorse, 
defiance and shame.36 Participation in the justice system might be used as a 
means of processing the myriad of sometimes conflicting emotions that an 
offender may experience before, during and after committing the offence. If 
we accept that rehabilitation and desistance are desirable goals for the 
criminal justice, then we should do everything to encourage verbalisation and 
the construction of personal narratives. This is, after all, a proven means by 
which individuals can be encouraged to accept responsibility for their actions, 
identify reasons for their offending behaviour; and learn practical techniques 
that may help them to desist in the future.37  
                                            
31
 E Erez, “Who’s Afraid of the Big Bad Victim? Victim Impact Statements as Victim 
Empowerment and Enhancement of Justice” [1999] Crim LR 545, pp. 550–51. 
32
 C Hoyle, “Empowerment through Emotion: The Use and Abuse of Victim Impact Evidence” 
in E Erez, M Kilchling and J Wemmers (eds), n. 23 above. 
33
 C Fercello and M Umbreit, Client evaluation of family group conferencing in 12 sites in 1st 
Judicial District of Minnesoto (St. Paul: Center for Restorative Justice & Mediation, 1998); 
Strang, Repair or Revenge?, n. 30 above. 
34
 Bibas and Bierschbach, “Integrating Remorse”, n. 9 above. 
35
 M Proeve, D Smith, & D Niblow, “Mitigation without definition: remorse in the criminal 
justice system” (1999) 32 Australia & New Zealand Journal of Criminology 16. 
36
 For a generally overview, see J Katz, Seductions of Crime: Moral and Sensual Attractions 
in Doing Evil (New York: Basic Books, 1988); D Canter and M Ioannou, “Criminals’ emotional 
experiences during crimes” (2004) 1 International Journal of Forensic Psychology 71; T 
Scheff and S. Retzinger, Emotions and Violence: Shame and Rage in Destructive Conflicts. 
(Lexington: Lexington Books, 1991); J Braithwaite,) ‘Shame and Modernity’ (1993) 33 British 
Journal of Criminology 1. 
37
 See eg R Masters, Counselling Criminal justice Offenders (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 
2003); S Tarolla, E Wagner, J Rabinowitz & J Tubman, “Understanding 
and treating juvenile offenders: A review of current knowledge and future directions” (2002) 7 
Aggression and Violent Behavior 125; A Moster, D Wnuk & E Jeglic, “Cognitive Behavioral 
Therapy Interventions With Sex Offenders” (2008) 14 Journal of Correctional Health Care 
109. 
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As with victims, criminal courts cannot or should be transformed in therapy 
rooms overnight, and there is little scientific evidence to support the 
therapeutic efficacy of “one-shot” forms of expression.38 However, it still 
seems sensible to at least explore the ways in which therapeutic potential of 
sentencing procedures can be maximized through the use of personal 
narratives, whilst simultaneously taking steps to minimise the risk of any anti-
therapeutic effects. 
 
 
(2) Strengthening Procedural Justice 
 
An increased emphasis on the role of emotion should ensure much improved 
levels of procedural justice. Procedural justice is crucial to ensuring the 
legitimacy of the criminal justice system. Basically, the theory stipulates that 
an individual’s sense of justice in any given case is largely dependent on the 
procedure that led to the decision (as opposed to merely the outcome).39 
Moreover, it has been found that individuals are likely to place more trust in 
authorities after a negative outcome than they did prior to that outcome, 
providing that the procedures followed have been perceived as fair.40 
 
There are a number of values and attributes that have come to be associated 
with high levels of procedural justice, including “representation, honesty, 
quality of decision, and consistency, and more generally of participation and 
esteem.”41 However, the notion of “voice’” is perhaps one of the most 
renowned yardsticks for procedural justice.42 As one recent study suggests 
the concept of “voice” is not just about expressing one’s needs but gravitates 
around communication and the concept of being heard.43 It is the mechanism 
used to express oneself, and as such it is indelibly intertwined with our 
emotions. The ability to exercise voice is critical for victims and offenders 
alike. Victims of violent crime, in particular, are often beset with negative 
emotions including fear, helplessness, shame, self-blame, anger and 
vulnerability that may prevail for some time.44 However, as noted in the 
                                            
38
 Pemberton & Reynaers, “The Controversial Nature”, n. 23 above. 
39
 See generally E Lind and T Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice (New York: 
Plenum Press, 1988). 
40
 Lind and Tyler, ibid; E Lind, C Kulik, M Ambrose & M de Vera Park, “Individual and 
Corporate Dispute Resolution: Using Procedural Fairness as a Decision Heuristic” (1993) 38 
Administrative Science Quarterly 224; T Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1990). 
41
 Tyler, ibid, p. 175. 
42
 See eg R Folger, “Distributive and procedural justice: Combined impact of voice and 
improvement on experienced inequity” (1977) 35 Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 108; Lind and Tyler, ibid; E Lind, R Kanfer, C Earley, “Voice, control, and 
procedural justice: Instrumental and noninstrumental concerns in fairness judgments” (1990) 
59 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 952. 
43
 J Wemmers and K Cyr, “What Fairness means to Crime Victims; A Social Psychological 
Perspective on Victim-Offender Mediation” (2006) 2 Applied Psychology in Criminal Justice 
102. 
44
 J Bisson & J Shepherd, “Psychological reactions of victims of violent crime” (1995) 167 
British Journal of Psychiatry 718; A Lurigio “Are all victims alike? The adverse, generalized, 
and differential impact of crime” (1987) 33 Crime & Delinquency 452; P Resick, 
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previous section, such negative emotions have been shown to be 
considerably reduced when victims are given the opportunity to participate in 
justice and personal narrative of their emotional journeys.  
 
In a similar way, victims value the opportunity to tell offenders how the offence 
impacted upon them and have their questions answered.45 A range of 
empirical studies confirm that victim participation in the criminal justice 
process enhances satisfaction with justice through giving victims a sense of 
empowerment and official, albeit symbolic, acknowledgement.46 Without a 
mechanism for exercising voice, procedures may seem fundamentally 
unbalanced - and thus unfair - given the offender’s right to express his or her 
emotions to the court through a mitigating plea.47    
 
Procedural justice and the concept of ‘voice’ are also important to offenders. 
Even victim impact evidence may instil a sense of procedural justice among 
offenders, since it provides a link between the impact of the offence and the 
imposition of punishment. Of course, offender participation is equally 
important. A study by Casper et al showed that convicted felons’ views as to 
whether their sentences were heavier than those given other offenders 
convicted of the same crime strongly correlated with their sense of whether 
their overall treatment was fair.48 Like victims, offenders are the owners of 
their stories and, as such, should ultimately control the message conveyed to 
the court on their behalf.49 The more an offender feels involved in the process, 
the more fair that process is likely to be perceived as fair. It might be surmised 
that being able to explain to the court the emotional turmoil that may have 
precipitated an offence, or the feelings of shame and remorse that followed in 
its aftermath, may all contribute to the sense of procedural justice experienced 
by offenders. 
 
An “emotionally intelligent” approach to sentencing would thus prioritise the 
role of voice. Both victims and offenders should be able to relate their 
emotions to the courtroom directly; in their own words and at their own pace. 
                                                                                                                             
“Psychological effects of victimization: Implications for the criminal justice system” (1987) 33 
Crime & Delinquency 468. 
45
 J Roberts and E Erez, “Communication in Sentencing: Exploring the Expressive Function of 
Victim Impact Statements” (2004) 10 International Review of Victimology 223. 238; J 
Shapland, J Willmore, and P Duff, Victims and the Criminal Justice System (Aldershot: 
Gower, 1985); Strang, Repair or Revenge?, n. 30 above.; J Wemmers, Victims in the Criminal 
Justice System (Amsterdam: Kugler Publications, 1996). 
46
 See eg E Erez, L Roeger, and F Morgan, “Victim Harm, Impact Statements and Victim 
Satisfaction with Justice: An Australian Experience” (1997) 5 International Review of 
Victimology 37; E Erez and E Bienkowska, “Victim Participation in Proceedings and 
Satisfaction with Justice in the Continental Systems: The Case of Poland” (1993) 21 Journal 
of Criminal Justice 47; Shapland et al, ibid., J Wemmers, “Victims in the Dutch Criminal 
Justice System” (1995) 3 International Review of Victimology 323; J Wemmers and K Cyr, 
“Victims’ Perspectives on Restorative Justice: How Much Involvement Are Victims Looking 
For?” (2004) 11 International Review of Victimology 259.  
47
 P Cassell, “In Defence of Victim Impact Statements” (2008) 6 Ohio State Journal of 
Criminal Law 611. 
48
 J Casper, T Tyler & B Fisher, “Procedural Justice in Felony Cases” (1988) 22 Law & 
Society Review 483. 
49
 K Thomas, “Beyond Mitigation: Towards a Theory of Allocution” (2007) 75 Fordham Law 
Review 2641, p. 2659. 
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The more of an opportunity victims and offenders are given to tell their 
emotional stories, the more likely it is that they will perceive the process as 
fair even where they are dissatisfied with the actual sentencing decision.  
Indeed, aside from specific benefits to victims and offenders, the criminal 
justice system as a whole stands to benefit from higher levels of procedural 
justice bolstered by emotions given its intrinsic value to legitimacy and more 
effective governance. Studies have shown that negative experiences of the 
criminal processes are likely to deter victims from co-operating in the future.50 
In the same way, procedural justice may be seen to contribute to desistance 
from future offending by instilling a greater sense of respect for the law, a 
willingness to remain within its parameters, and a greater sense of legitimacy 
of its institutions. 
 
 
(3) Improving the Quality of Decision- Making 
 
An emotionally-intelligent approach to sentencing would also carry a third 
potential benefit, insofar that it may enhance the quality of the decision-
making process. In most common law jurisdictions, the question of sentence 
is resolved primarily by reference to offence seriousness. Determining 
seriousness is not a precise science; it may depend on any number of factors 
depending on the jurisdiction, although culpability and harm tend to act as 
common indictors.51  
 
Emotions – and the ability to empathise - may be useful to sentencers in 
providing a more accurate picture of both culpability and harm. As the former 
US Federal Judge Irving R. Kaufman explained, “our intuition, emotion and 
conscience are appropriate factors in the jurisprudential calculus.”52 Learning 
about the offender’s emotional state prior to, during and after the offence 
gives way to a truer perception concerning the question of culpability. Anger, 
hatred and resentment prior to the offence may all give an indication as to 
motive, which in turn may provide evidence of intention and blameworthiness. 
Similarly, blameworthiness may be lessened if the offender was depressed, 
anxious or nervous. Information of this type allows the sentencer to empathise 
and appreciate the perspective of others and how blameworthy they ought to 
be in the eyes of the law.53   
 
In a similar way, the more sentencers learn about the emotions of victims, the 
more information they glean about the full extent of the harm that has been 
caused. Cassell and Erez both cite a number of empirical studies highlighting 
how sentencers often value the additional information supplied within victim 
impact evidence.54 In the context of emotions, this is perhaps most obvious in 
                                            
50
 Shapland, Willmore, and Duff, Victims, n. 43 above. 
51
 “Seriousness” in England and Wales is determined by the offender’s culpability as well as 
“any harm which the offence caused, was intended to cause or might foreseeably have 
caused: Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 143(1). 
52
 I R Kaufmann, “The Anatomy of Decisionmaking” (1984) 53 Fordham Law Review 1, p. 16.  
53
 See further Bandes, “Empathy”, n. 6 above. 
54
 Cassell, “In Defence”, n. 45 above; “E Erez, “Who’s Afraid of the Big Bad Victim? Victim 
Impact Statements as Victim Empowerment and Enhancement of Justice” [1999] Criminal 
Law Review 545. 
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relation to psychiatric or emotional harm, which is becoming more widely 
recognised, in addition to harms which are physical or material in nature.55 
Victims would be better placed than anyone else to describe the nature and 
extent of their emotional and psychological states and, in doing so, 
sentencers would be granted important new insights into dimensions of the 
case of which they may not previously have been aware. 
 
However, many opponents of victim allocution maintain that emotional 
outpourings endanger the objectivity of sentencing and are inherently 
inappropriate for the courtroom.56 Susan Bandes, for example, warns that the 
“hatred, bigotry, and unreflective empathy” contained within victim impact 
statements serves to demean the dignity of both victims and offenders.57 
Whilst Bandes’ comments were made in the specific context of US capital 
murder trials, they nonetheless underline the need to carefully consider what 
emotions victims actually convey through their participation in criminal justice. 
Whilst it may be foolhardy to deny that many victims experience deep-seated 
feelings of anger, hatred and desire some measure of revenge, studies 
suggest that victims would seem to be no more punitive than the general 
public in relation to sentencing attitudes.58 Moreover, as with offenders 
expressing remorse, the sentencer is under no obligation to believe the 
statement or to alter the proposed sentence in response to victim outrage.59 
Therefore we should entrust sentences to use their judgment and discretion 
appropriately and in the manner in which they have been trained and 
educated.  
 
Finally, a better understanding of emotions may also assist judges in tailoring 
the specific nature of a sentence so that it best “fits” the offender. As Thomas 
argues, taking close account of how the offender feels, and how he/she is 
likely to respond to a sentence can help to ensure that the sentence is likely to 
be beneficial in achieving its goals: 
 
Having this information could allow judges and other actors in the 
criminal justice system to develop a more nuanced portrait of 
defendants. By doing so, these officials may, for example, be better 
                                            
55
 The English courts have come under some criticism for their failure to attach criminal 
liability of emotional harm that is unaccompanied by recognised psychiatric injury. See further 
J Stannard, “Sticks, stones and words: emotional harm and the English criminal law” (2010) 
74 Journal of Criminal Law 533. A similar critique has been made of the position in the 
English civil courts: see R Mulheron, “Rewriting the requirement for a “recognized psychiatric 
injury” in negligence claims” (2012) 32 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 77. 
56
 See eg Bandes, “Empathy” n. 6 above. 
57
 Ibid., p. 394.  
58
 See eg M Hough and A Park, ‘How malleable are attitudes to crime and punishment ? 
Findings from a British deliberative poll’ in J. Roberts and M. Hough (eds), Changing Attitudes 
to Punishment. (Cullompton: Willan, 2002); J Mattinson and C Mirrlees-Black, Attitudes to 
Crime and Criminal Justice: Findings from the 1998 British crime Survey (London: Home 
Office, 2000). S Maruna and A King, "Public Opinion and Community Penalties" in T. 
Bottoms, S. Rex & G. Robinson (Eds.) Alternatives to Prison: Options for an Insecure Society 
(Cullompton: Willan, 2004). 
59
 Indeed, arguably most victims already realise this fact and wish to participate 
notwithstanding: see P G Cassell, “Barbarians at the Gates? A Reply to the Critics of the 
Victims' Rights Amendment” (1999) Utah Law Review 479. 
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able to develop creative solutions to criminal justice problems or to 
observe trends in offender characteristics or behaviour.60 
 
Using the specific example of shaming-type punishments, Thomas argues 
that  whilst in some cases, a punishment involving some degree of  public 
moral condemnation or embarrassment might be acceptable, in other cases it 
would have a disproportionate effect on the offender’s rehabilitation efforts.61  
Similar arguments might also be levied in terms of the impact of 
imprisonment. In sum, the more detailed and holistic the picture that is 
offered, the more accurate and proportionate the sentence is likely to be. 
 
 
(4) Transforming Relationships between Victims and Offenders 
 
A more central role for emotions could also herald new and better 
opportunities for reconciliation between the victim and the offender. Drawing 
on Randall Collins’ theory of interaction rituals,62 Sherman et al. contend that 
the dissemination of emotions (which may include anger, compassion, 
remorse and shame) create a new shared experience and sense of 
solidarity.63 This reflects what social psychologists have termed the so-called 
‘contact hypothesis’, which postulates that conflict can be most effectively 
resolved through direct and deliberative contact and communication between 
conflicting parties.64 In this sense, a previously broken bond may be 
transformed by the emotional energy into a new social bond, providing a 
potential platform for repair of broken relationships. Individual narratives of 
victims and offender can create a coherent story-frame for both victims and 
offenders, and their interaction can thereby create a new ‘co-narrative’ which 
can serve to affirm a new norm, vindicate victims, humanise offenders, and 
denounce the evil of an act without labelling any person as a villain.65  
 
In order for this to happen, sentencing procedure would need to open a more 
communicative conduit capable of facilitating dialogue between victims and 
offenders. There is already an abundance of evidence that victims place a 
high value on receiving apologies,66 and this prospect is often an important 
factor influencing their decision to become involved in mediation and 
restorative justice programmes.67 A genuine apology should signal to the 
victim that the offender genuinely regrets his or her behavior and wishes to 
                                            
60
 Thomas, “Beyond Mitigation”, n. 49 above, p. 2675. 
61
 As illustrated, for example, through the use of “shaming” practices which are frequently 
criticized on the ground that they are reflective of the “punitive turn: see n 3 above.  
62
 R Collins, Interaction ritual chains (Princeton, MA: Princeton University Press, 2004). 
63
 L Sherman, H Strang, C Angel, D Woods, G Barnes, S Bennett, and N Inkpen, “Effects of 
face-to-face restorative justice on victims of crime in four randomized controlled trials” (2005) 
1 Journal of Experimental Criminology 367. 
64
 See generally WG Stephen, “Intergroup Contact: Introduction” (1995) 41 Journal of Social 
Issues 1; RJ Fisher, The Social Psychology of Intergroup and International Conflict Resolution 
(Springer: New York, 1990). 
65
 See further J Braithwaite, ‘Narrative and “compulsory compassion,”’ Law and Social Inquiry 
31 (2006): 425-446; Thomas, “Beyond Mitigation”, n. 49 above, pp. 2673-74. 
66
 Fercello and Umbreit, n. 33 above; Strang, Repair or Revenge?, n. 30 above. 
67
 Strang, Repair or Revenge?, n. 30 above. 
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make amends. The victim is then empowered to choose whether to accept the 
apology (thereby restoring a state of equality), or reject it, allowing that moral 
imbalance to stay in place.68 
 
The potential benefits of an apology are not limited to victims. As Etienne and 
Robbennolt point out, offenders who apologise “may be  able to relieve their  
guilt and assuage other negative emotions, begin to repair their relationships 
with  their victims  and society, improve  their reputations,  and  begin  a  
process  of  reintegrating  into  society.”69 Similarly, encouraging the 
expression of remorse and/or repentance is something that is potentially 
valuable to the community, in terms of the offender having acknowledged that 
communal norms have been breached.70 It is also highly probably that most 
people who are remorseful and repentant are less dangerous, and are 
thereby less likely to reoffend than those who are unrepentant or defiant.71 
This would be particularly true in the case of first-time offenders.72  
 
It will be apparent that the four potential benefits outlined above are not 
necessarily discrete and may overlap.  Whilst care should be taken, for 
example, not to conflate victims’ sense of procedural justice with therapeutic 
benefits, some studies have suggested that such a link exists.73 In the same 
way, the expression of an apology or reconciliation during the sentence may 
also significantly increase both procedural satisfaction as well as carrying 
therapeutic effects. Having outlined a range of purported benefits, the next 
section proceeds to consider the extent to which emotional intelligence 
underpins the sentencing process of England and Wales. 
 
The Role of Emotional Narratives in the English Sentencing Process 
 
Since the beginning of the eighteenth century, a process of adversarialisation 
and lawyerisation of criminal trials has resulted in the silencing of victims and 
offenders in English criminal justice.74 This “appropriation” of private 
conflicts75 turned the trial into a showdown between lawyers representing the 
State and the defence, with the role of the primary stakeholders being 
                                            
68
 C Petrucci, “Apology in the criminal justice setting; Evidence for including apology as 
additional component in the legal system” (2002) 20 Behavioral Science and the Law 337. 
69
  M Etienne and J K Robbennolt, “Apologies and Plea Bargaining” (2007) 91 Marquette Law 
Review 295, p. 298. 
70
 S Bibas, “Forgiveness in Criminal Procedure” (2007) 4 Ohio State Journal of Criminal 
Law 329.  
71
 J G Murphy, “Remorse, Apology, and Mercy” (2007) 4 Ohio State Journal of Criminal 
Law 423. 
72
 J Jacobson and M Hough, “Personal Mitigation in England and Wales” in J Roberts (ed), 
Mitigation and Aggravation at Sentencing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
73
 J Wemmers and C Cyr, “Can Mediation Be Therapeutic for Crime Victims? An Evaluation of 
Victims' Experiences in Mediation with Young Offenders” (2005) 47 Canadian Journal of 
Criminology and Criminal Justice 527. 
74 J H Langbein, The Origins of the Adversary Criminal Trial (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003). 
75 N Christie, ‘Conflicts as Property’ (1977) 17 British Journal of Criminology 1. 
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restricted to “evidentiary cannon fodder” for one side or the other.76 Whilst the 
end of the nineteenth was marked by the emergence of a common law right of 
allocution for the defence,77 the latter years of the twentieth century and early 
years of the twenty-first century have witnessed a drive towards similar 
participatory rights for victims.78 In this section we particularly focus on the 
ways in which the emotional narratives of victims and offenders can be taken 
into account when determining sentence; with particular reference to the 
communication of offenders’ emotions through pre-sentence reports and 
pleas in mitigation, and the communication of victims’ emotions through Victim 
Personal Statements (VPS) and Family Impact Statements (FIS).  
 
 
The Narratives of Offenders  
 
Most offenders play a passive role in English criminal trials. Whilst some may 
testify in their own defence, it is rare for offenders to speak directly at the 
sentencing stage. Nonetheless, offenders may convey their emotions 
indirectly to the court through two channels, the pre-sentence report (PSR) 
and the plea in mitigation. 
 
Section 156 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 stipulates that courts must obtain 
a PSR and take it into account in determining sentence unless it forms the 
opinion that a pre-sentence report is unnecessary.79 Their purpose is to assist 
the courts “in determining the most suitable method of dealing with an 
offender”;80 in other words, it gives the sentencer a better idea of the 
seriousness of the offence as well as the offender’s suitability to carry out 
particular types of sentences. While the report may contain a sentence 
recommendation, the court is not bound to follow this and can deviate from 
any recommendation if it chooses to do so.81 
 
To this end, PSRs are heavily based on probing interviews with a probation 
officer.82 Its precise form and contents are laid down within the National 
Standards for the Management of Offenders,83 although it can be noted that 
interviews will typically cover offending information; analysis of the offences; 
                                            
76 J Braithwaite, ‘Juvenile Offending: New Theory and Practice.’ Address to the National 
Conference on Juvenile Justice, Adelaide, Institute of Criminology, September 1992. 
77 The practice of permitting the defendant to make an unsworn statement from the dock 
evolved in the nineteenth century as a means of enabling some form of personal participation 
by the defendant. It was not until the passage of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 that 
defendants were permitted to give evidence on oath. For comparative US perspective, see 
Thomas, “Beyond Mitigation”, n. 49 above.  
78 See generally J Doak, 'Participatory Rights for Victims of Crime: In search of international 
consensus' (2011) 15 Canadian Criminal Law Review 41. 
79 Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 156(3). While the report may contain a sentence 
recommendation, the court is not bound to follow this and can deviate from that 
recommendation if it chooses to do so. 
80 Criminal Justice Act 2003, s158. 
81 Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 156(4). 
82 Or, in the case of a young offender, by a social worker or a member of a Youth Offending 
Team. 
83
 Ministry of Justice, National Standards for the Management of Offenders (London: Ministry 
of Justice, 2011).  
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accommodation; education; training and employability; financial management 
and income; relationships; lifestyle and associates; drug and alcohol issues; 
emotional wellbeing; thinking and behaviour including the offender’s attitudes 
towards the victim and the offence.84 Offenders may be asked by the 
probation officer about attitudes to the victim and the offence; the level of the 
awareness of its consequences; the extent to which responsibility is accepted; 
along with relevant emotional responses as denial, defiance, remorse, shame 
or a desire to make amends for their actions.85  
 
When PSRs were introduced by the Criminal Justice Act 1991, there was a 
sense of optimism that this new opportunity for offenders to exercise ‘voice’ 
would constitute a welcome departure from the conveyor belt of lawyer-led 
proceedings. Such an aspiration was expressed by one commentator in a 
1992 article in the Criminal Law Review: 
 
The probation officer is requested to interview the defendant in a 
private, relatively unhurried, in-depth encounter, having some of the 
ambience of the confessional, encouraging the defendant to be candid, 
open and trusting. Defendants can welcome this opportunity to speak 
because they can feel listened to, understood and respected in a way 
that may be missing from their other encounters with criminal justice 
professionals.86 
 
Notwithstanding the best efforts of many officers, such hopes seem to have 
given way to a sense of frustration as demands for cost efficiency have 
impacted on both the number and nature of pre-sentence reports. The 
introduction of the computerised Offender Assessment System (OASys) in 
2001 added considerably to resource investment required to complete full 
reports,87 which triggered a decision to change the majority of reports to a 
“fast-delivery” format based on a “tick-box” exercise.88 Interviews for these 
types of reports tend to be considerably less detailed since the reports are 
usually completed within the same day. Interviews thus tend to be 
considerably shorter, with less scope for defendants to relay their narratives. 
“Full” or “standard” reports are now restricted to more complex and serious 
cases where it would not be deemed possible to provide sufficient information 
to meet the needs of the court within the “fast delivery” report.89  
 
The second means by which the offender may communicate emotions is 
through the plea in mitigation. This is an oral statement read to the court by 
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 P Whitehead, “The probation service reporting for duty: court reports and social justice” 
(2008) 6 British Journal of Community Justice 86. 
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 N Stone, “Pre-sentence reports, culpability and the 1991 Act” [1992] Crim LR 558. 
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the defence advocate and which has traditionally brought a wide range of 
factors to the attention of the court, including information about the offender 
and the circumstances of their offence in a bid to reduce the severity of the 
sentence. Whilst it is not uncommon for offenders to speak for themselves in 
the United States, this is relatively rare in England and Wales. Nevertheless, it 
has been suggested that sentencers may place greater emphasis on the plea 
in mitigation than the pre-sentence report, given that the former may have 
been prepared some time beforehand.90 There is also some evidence to 
suggest that PSRs may be afforded less weight because judges may view 
them as encroaching upon their “ownership” of the sentencing process, since 
they essentially amount to a recommendation by an outsider as to how to 
perform that role.91 By contrast, pleas in mitigation are delivered by lawyers, 
who are insiders to the court and may be seen as having a more legitimate 
conduit to the judge. 
 
Given that there are limited channels in which offenders are able to 
communicate their emotions to the court, we must consider the question of 
what weight – if any – is attached to these emotions in determining sentence. 
The starting point for the court is its assessment of the seriousness of the 
offence. This is undertaken by reference to the culpability of the offender and 
the harm he or she caused / intended to cause / might foreseeably have 
caused.92 Once the level of seriousness has been determined, the court must 
take account of any aggravating or mitigating factors as well as any personal 
mitigation of the offender. It is within this latter context that the Sentencing 
Guidelines Council has envisaged that the emotions of the offender 
(specifically remorse) may enter the equation: 
 
1.27 When the court has formed an initial assessment of the 
seriousness of the offence, then it should consider any offender 
mitigation. The issue of remorse should be taken into account at this 
point along with other mitigating features such as admissions to the 
police in interview.93 
 
In addition to the generic provision above, existing Sentencing Guidelines 
make specific reference to offender remorse as a mitigatory factor in relation 
to assault offences, attempted murder, and burglary.94 However, none of the 
Guidelines offer any indication as to the form it ought to take or the weight that 
odd to be attached to it. The extent to which the sentencer’s discretion will be 
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used to consider such information is very much dependant on the subjective 
view of sentencersas to the relevance of such factors, and the extent to which 
the offender’s legal representative seeks to bring the offender’s emotions to 
the attention of the court in their plea in mitigation.  
 
The variable effect of emotional expressions was confirmed by a study by 
Jacobson and Hough who analysed the role in personal mitigation in some 
132 cases across five Crown Court centres in 2007.95 It was found that 
emotional responses of the accused did bear some influence on the 
sentencing decision, although mere expressions of remorse alone were 
unlikely to carry much weight in the minds of the sentencers. Such 
expressions became much more effective in bringing about sentence 
reduction where it was accompanied by honest discussion of the 
circumstances of the offending behaviour or a gesture, such as a letter of 
apology to the court.96 Admittedly, determining the extent of remorse was an 
uncertain exercise; judges spoke of using “experience and feeling” or “gut 
feeling rather than careful calculation.”’97 Emotions also entered into 
sentencing where the sentencer believed that the prosecution process caused 
the offender to suffer emotionally.98 Such suffering is sometimes treated as 
part of the punishment for the crime, thereby lessening the severity of 
sentence.99 Emotional stress at the time of the offence was also taken into 
account as a mitigating factor in a small amount of cases. 
 
In summary then, offenders have limited capacity to provide emotional 
narratives to the court; the system is structurally conditioned for them to 
remain passive observers in their own cases. Although some offenders will 
communicate expressions of remorse through counsel as part of their plea in 
mitigation, such sentiments are communicated to the court; offenders are not 
encouraged to provide explanations or apologies directly to victims. A 
generally remorseful offender has no clear channel to pursue should s/he 
want to do so, and since such gestures are not generally repaid in the 
currency of sentencing law, so it is unsurprising that processes are not put in 
place to facilitate them. While remorse is perhaps the most desirable emotion, 
it may not be the only one which offenders experience at the point of 
sentence. While protests of innocence or messages of defiance may not be 
what the victim, the public or the sentencer want to hear, arguably these 
stories should also be heard.100   
 
The Narratives of Victims 
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The most common (and most hotly contested) means of participation is 
through giving some of form of victim impact evidence at the point of 
sentence. Since October 2001, victims are entitled to submit a Victim 
Personal Statement (VPS) to the court containing details of how the crime 
affected them; whether they feel vulnerable or intimidated; whether they are 
worried about the offender being given bail; whether they are considering a 
compensation claim; and anything else that they feel may be helpful or 
relevant.101  A more advanced version of the VPS scheme also exists for the 
benefit of relatives bereaved by homicide; the Victim Focus Scheme (VFS) 
operates in a similar way allowing families to submit a “Family Impact 
Statement”, which means (unlike the VPS) that the statement will be read 
aloud in court by the prosecutor or the judge.102  
 
Inclusion in the scheme is voluntary and it is possible for all crime victims to 
participate, with the exception of large retailers and corporations. In line with 
the Lord Chief Justice’s Consolidated Criminal Practice Direction,103 the police 
officer transcribing the statement is likely to guide the victim as to the issues 
they may wish to include such as the financial, emotional, psychological, 
physical or other impacts that the crime has had upon them. The officer 
should also advise the victim to avoid the inclusion of their opinion on 
sentence as this is considered irrelevant to the sentencing decision. Although 
this may be preferable than leaving victims to their own devices, there is a risk 
that the more emotional aspects of victim narrative might come to be replaced 
with a sanitised and innocuous version of events which is less capable of fully 
conveying to the court the full intricacies of the crime’s impact upon the victim. 
 
The VPS is appended to the case papers, but will only be considered by the 
sentencer as and when a finding of guilt has been reached. Its legal 
significance is detailed in the Practice Direction as well as the Court of Appeal 
in R v Perks.104 While both authorities make it very clear that the victim’s 
opinions as to sentence must be disregarded, they also stipulate that the 
information contained within the VPS should be taken into account in in 
determining offence seriousness. Although weight that ought to be attached to 
these factors has never been clarified in precise terms, they appeared to 
weigh heavily in the Court of Appeal’s determination of the appropriate 
sentence in R v Saw,105 a domestic burglary case. Here Lord Phillips CJ drew 
attention to the adverse consequences that may follow a burglary. Such 
effects, he noted, related not only to the emotional consequences of material 
loss, but also to the aggravating impact of the severe shock that victims often 
experience, especially the elderly, when intruders are known to have been 
present in their homes. In the eyes of the court, the emotional effects of 
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burglary on the victim could clearly be taken into account alongside the state’s 
interests in consistency and proportionality or other factors relating to the 
offender’s interest culpability. 
 
The recent publication of the Sentencing Council’s Definitive Guidelines has 
affirmed the position that the impact of the crime on the victim as a factor 
affecting sentence severity.106 Indeed, some make implied reference to the 
emotional well-being of the victim as an aggravating factor; for example, the 
Guideline on Assault Offences states that “ongoing effects upon the victim” 
can merit an upward adjustment in sentence severity.107 While this does not 
specifically mention emotional impact, this can clearly be encompassed within 
the notion of “ongoing effects.” The Guideline on burglary similarly makes 
reference to “significant trauma to the victim”108 as an aggravating factor; and 
again this may encompass the concept of emotional harm. 
 
It is not always, however, the case that the impact of the offence on the victim 
will constitute an aggravating factor. Indeed, the Court of Appeal has been 
willing on a number of occasions to reduce a sentence where it was felt that 
the original decision exaggerated the impact on the victim or on his or her 
family. A sentence of four years’ imprisonment for causing death by 
dangerous driving was reduced to three years in R v Nunn,109 where the 
mother and sister of the deceased appellant had given evidence that the 
length of sentence was adding to their grief. Similarly, in R v Matthews,110 the 
appellant’s five year prison sentence for the manslaughter of his brother was 
reduced to three years because of concerns about the impact a lengthier 
sentence would carry on other family members.111 
 
This underscores the point that considerable care needs to be exercised in 
making assumptions about what victims actually seek through participating in 
the criminal process and, specifically, the extent to which they seek 
vengeance through doing so. Although content analysis of victim impact 
evidence is somewhat thin on the ground, research conducted in Staffordshire 
in 2005 by one of the authors suggests that where a victim chooses to 
participate in the VPS scheme they are very likely to include an outline of the 
emotional impact that the crime has had upon them.112 The content analysis 
conducted as part of that study found that 88% of the 233 VPS considered 
included information outlining the emotional response of the victim to the 
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crime committed against them, with the most often cited emotions being fear, 
upset and anger.113 While many of emotional responses would tend towards 
sentence aggravation there were also limited instances where victims 
displayed emotional responses such as sympathy and empathy,114 which 
could serve to mitigate the offender’s sentence. These findings broadly 
correlate with other studies.115 In their  evaluation of the VPS pilots, Hoyle et 
al found that, as indicated earlier, ‘rather thanT encouraging exaggeration, 
inflammatory statements, and vindictiveness, the opposite appears to apply: 
they [victim personal statements] tend to understate rather than over-state the 
impact of offences.’116 Similarly, in Chalmer’s et al analysis of the content of 
victim statements in Scotland, statements made concerning sentence tended 
to be unspecific and some even displayed some concern for the offender and 
requested a lighter sentence.117 Even where victims do express anger or a 
desire for vengeance, sentencers have little problem disentangling legally 
relevant information from that which is inappropriate conjecture or opinion.118  
 
It is vital, however, that victims are made fully aware of the purpose of their 
participation. In particular, they should be advised in very clear terms that they 
cannot make specific demands as to sentence, and that the effect of the crime 
upon them is only one of a number of factors which the sentence must 
consider.119 A number of studies have identified a real risk that victims may 
end up frustrated and even more isolated if they feel their expectations have 
not been met.120 This is a particularly salient finding given that studies suggest 
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that victim impact evidence rarely influences sentencing decisions to a 
significant degree.121  
 
Although the VPS and VFS do open a channel through which victims can 
communicate their emotions to the court, the emotional power of their stories 
is likely to be significantly diminished by the fact that they are unable to 
address either the defendant or the court in person. Unlike the United States, 
where victims are able to exercise a right to allocution in all federal and most 
state criminal hearings, victims in England and Wales are restricted to 
exercising their voice indirectly, through a third person. Whilst the VFS was 
initially intended to give victims of homicide the choice between reading an 
oral statement themselves or leaving that task to counsel, this option has 
since been withdrawn. In their evaluation of the VFS pilots,122 Sweeting et al 
found that a significant minority of victims (22%) had opted to present them in 
person. This was an opportunity that appeared to be valued by the families 
who did so, with the husband of one deceased victim telling the researchers 
that he was “doing it because I just felt I owed it.”123 Moreover, the 
researchers noted that overcoming the fear of speaking in court on such an 
emotional subject had helped victims to feel empowered and more satisfied 
with the process. It was also reported that there was a perception among 
practitioners that family members felt they could have a greater personal 
impact and “do more to help” by delivering the evidence themselves. Although 
self-delivery of the statement tends to involve additional work for all 
stakeholders, it is regrettable that the emotional potential of the VFS has been 
curtailed by placing restrictions on the victim’s role, rather than seeking to 
strengthen it. 
The Limits of Emotion  
 
There is clearly some scope for victims and offenders to communicate their 
emotional narratives to court. Certainly, opportunities to do so have increased 
in recent years. However, by the same token, the room for emotional 
narratives is still extremely small, and an emotionally intelligent approach to 
sentencing involves more than victims and offenders expressing their views to 
the court in a formulaic and mechanistic manner. Evidentiary and procedural 
rules, and the structure of the trial as an adversarial content mean that victims 
and offenders can only portray their stories in a way that lies within these 
stringent parameters. This is particularly true within magistrates’ courts; 
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sentencing here has been said to be “swift to the point of abruptness, relying 
heavily on the speedy delivery of guilty pleas.”124 Indeed, many victims will opt 
not to attend such hearings, and will thus not hear any emotions expressed by 
the offender or his/her lawyer. 
 
As Habermas famously observed, the justice system has become ‘colonized’ 
by abstract principles of formal law, drawing the court of law away from the 
Lebensweld or ‘lifeworld’, this being the typical environment which human 
beings experience and use as a point of reference in their personal narratives 
and in their relationships with others.125 Intimate, informal and direct 
interactions generally act as precursors and conveyers of apology and 
forgiveness,126 and these are a far cry far cry from the world of the criminal 
court. Here, the formal environment is bipartisan, rigidly structured, ritualistic 
and dominated by zealous advocates.127 It is the advocates, rather than 
victims or offenders, who assume the roles of story-tellers, suppressing 
individual narrative autonomy, shaping narratives to bring out their maximum 
adversarial effect,128 and turning witnesses into “weapons to be used against 
the other side”.129 There is no physical space or procedural mechanism 
though which victims or offenders might communicate freely  their own stories 
in the way that makes sense to them. Bilbas and Bierschbach contend that 
this explains why apologies, expressions of remorse, and victim 
acknowledgement or forgiveness are exceedingly rare in US courtrooms: 
 
Courtrooms are quasi-public settings, where defendants' families and 
close friends are often present. This setting can humiliate offenders, 
especially those who prize their reputations most highly (such as white-
collar offenders) or who have committed highly stigmatized crimes 
(such as sex offenders). Sentencing allocutions, moreover, are tightly 
scheduled, hurried, vague, and often in front of a judge who did not 
preside over the guilty plea. For most defendants, this is their first real 
chance to apologize for their crime to victims or the community. It is no 
wonder that, when apologies do occur at sentencing, they often are 
stilted, forced, or ‘not enough’130 
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It might be added that even those emotions which are successfully 
communicated to the court are passive and ‘locked’ in time. Victims may have 
prepared a VPS many months, or perhaps longer, before sentencing occurs. 
The emotions contained in that document may no longer reflect how they feel 
at the point of sentence. The passage of time, counselling, and other forms of 
support and assistance may have changed the way the impact of the offence 
and their feelings towards the offender. Family impact statements prepared 
under the VFS, and indeed pleas in mitigation, can be more easily tailored to 
the moment. However, these also represent a very momentary insight into the 
emotions of victims and offenders. We are unlikely to gain much deeper 
insights into the life journey of victims and offenders, how they felt about the 
fairness legal process, and how their emotions might have evolved over time. 
There is a considerable body of evidence supporting the idea that emotions, 
as cognitive processes, may fluctuate and are open to change;131  both 
victims and offenders may feel an array of complex and potentially 
contradictory emotions in the aftermath of an offence. Unfortunately, the 
sentencing system does not offer a means of communicating this fluidity to 
other stakeholders or the court. 
 
 
Future Directions: Towards Emotionally Intelligent Practice  
 
A fully-fledged emotionally-intelligent model of sentencing may depend on a 
significant reconfiguration of penal ideology. Such a normative shift remains 
an indeterminate prospect in the short to medium term. However, it is still 
conceivable to think of a number of ways in which emotion might usefully play 
a more central role within the existing normative parameters of the criminal 
justice system. There are three ways, in particular, by which current 
sentencing might be better tailored to facilitate the communication of 
emotions.  
 
1. The Need for Legal Clarity 
 
First, there is a need to clarify the legal weight that can be attached to the 
emotions of victims and offenders in sentencing. As a starting point, the 
Sentencing Council ought to consider providing more detailed guidance 
concerning their operation of discretion vis-à-vis personal mitigation. As noted 
above, current guidance offers very little detail as to the weight that 
sentencers ought to attach to personal mitigation in general, and expressions 
of remorse in particular. Judges could, for example, be offered guidance as to 
how remorse might be assessed; whether it might carry more weight if 
accompanied by an unconditional apology, an offer of reparation or any other 
step taken to make amends. Bibas proposes that US federal sentencing law 
should be amended to replace the almost-automatic 35% sentence discount 
for guilty pleas with a sliding scale that reflects remorse, apology, and 
forgiveness. It is our contention that the English sentencing system, which 
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also operates a similar automatic discount,132 may also benefit through the 
introduction of a similar mechanism. 
 
Clarity is also needed in respect of the function of VPS and VFS. Although the 
Lord Chief Justice and the Court of Appeal have attempted to shed light on 
their potential impact on sentences, there is still no guidance as to the nature 
of the relationship between (emotional) harm to victims and offence 
seriousness. Yet the duty to shed light on the role and function of the VPS 
and VFS is not limited to the judiciary. Both initiatives were introduced citing a 
myriad of justifications and objectives,133 and it is unclear whether they their 
primary purpose concerns boosting satisfaction levels (and/or therapeutic 
benefits) among victims, or whether they are simply intended to give the 
sentencer an improved picture of past events. It would be helpful for both 
stakeholders and practitioners to know how emotional harm might be 
specifically weighed alongside other factors in determining the overall 
seriousness of the offence. As things stand, rates of participation vary 
considerably across the country and victims seem unsure of the purpose of 
the schemes.134 This can lead to later problems insofar as victims may feel 
dissatisfied if their expectations have remained unmet. To this end, a much 
clearer system of protocols and guidelines for professionals and information 
sheets for victims themselves could give victims a better picture of what 
participation does and does not entail and what they can expect from the 
process.135 
 
 
2. The Need for Victim / Offender Interaction 
 
A second emotionally-intelligent reform would entail the opening up of 
communication channels between victims and offenders. As mentioned 
above, this would not only help to resolve conflicts between individuals, but 
might also send out a broader message to society concerning the social 
causes of crime and punishment and how best to address them.136 Victims 
and offenders should - if they so choose – have the opportunity to engage in 
dialogue with each other, rather than talking to the court through lawyers. 
Under this proposal, victims would be conferred with a direct right of allocution 
and would be able to prepare and read their own statements in court. They 
would be given broad remit as to the content, and might also include 
photographs, drawings or poems as is currently permitted in the Australian 
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state of Victoria.137 Importantly, victims could also ask questions of the 
offender; the ‘why me?’ question, in particular, is one which tends to 
preoccupy victims of serious crime.138  
 
Offenders should also be offered the opportunity to respond to victims’ 
statements, and, indeed, challenge them where appropriate. The lawyer-led 
plea in mitigation would be replaced by the opportunity for the offender to 
deliver a statement in person. This would take the form of a narrative that 
would not be confined by the parameters of legal relevance. Offenders would 
be free to recount aspects of their life stories and their emotions before, 
during and after the offence. Such emotions would not only cover the 
“acceptable” feelings of shame and remorse but offenders would also be free 
to make protests of innocence or defiance. Just as offenders would have a 
right to challenge aspects of the victim’s evidence, so too would victims be 
empowered to challenge any aspect of the offender’s statement. It is, 
perhaps, self-evident that a risk exists that a dialogue of this nature could 
quite easily spiral into a freewheeling fracas, or indeed the victim narrative 
could become dominant, thereby drowning or pre-empting the account of the 
offender.139 However, with careful formulated ground rules, close facilitation 
by the trial judge, and preparation and oversight by legal professionals, such a 
risk could be substantially reduced.  
 
 
3. Integrating Restorative Justice within Sentencing 
 
A more radical step than either of the two proposals set out above would 
entail the mainstreaming of restorative justice. Restorative justice 
programmes provide a forum for victims and offenders to exchange views 
and emotions within a safe environment. In spite of its growing popularity, 
restorative justice remains a contested concept, which has proved difficult to 
define in concise terms. One of the more widely accepted definitions is that 
provided by Tony Marshall, who described it as “a process whereby all the 
parties with a stake in a particular offence come together to resolve 
collectively how to deal with the aftermath of the offence and its implications 
for the future.”140 In restorative justice settings, personal narratives are used 
“to understand the harms, the needs, the pains and the capacities of all 
participants so that an appropriate new story can be constructed.”141 They 
are typically delivered in the victim’s own words, and at his or her own pace. 
In contrast to the courtroom, a new ‘co-narrative’ is created to collectively 
affirm a norm, vindicate a victim, and denounce the evil of an act without 
labelling any person as a villain.142  
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While many post-conviction and prison-based schemes exist throughout 
England and Wales, these operate independently of the formal sentencing 
process and lie on the periphery of the criminal justice system. Research 
evidence suggests that restorative justice delivers considerably higher 
satisfaction levels among stakeholders than court. In a meta-study of seven 
RJ programmes which compared restorative practices with court-based 
sentencing, Poulson found that almost three -quarters (74%) of offenders 
apologized in RJ settings, around the same proportion (71%) who went 
through the court process did not apologize.143 In other words, offenders 
were 6.9 times more likely to apologize to the victim in restorative justice 
settings than in court.  If we accept that emotions matter – but are difficult to 
channel within the confines of the criminal court – it may be that we ought to 
look at how the court might make use of restorative justice operating in a 
different environment. 
 
With appropriate safeguards, court-ordered mediation and conferencing could 
serve to complement existing sentence practice. Referrals to mediation are 
becoming increasingly commonplace within continental Europe; Austria and 
Finland both operate schemes whereby the law provides that certain cases 
may be diverted away from court at the prosecution stage.144 Perhaps the 
most useful lesson for England and Wales, however, comes from across the 
Irish Sea. In Northern Ireland, all young people who plead guilty or who are 
convicted of an offence are referred to conferencing either by the Public 
Prosecution Service or by the court (providing they consent to the process).145 
The subsequent agreement is then returned to court for approval by the 
magistrate to ensure that the sentence is not disproportionate and that the 
public interest is served. Although careful thought would need to be given to 
the roll-out of any equivalent scheme for adults in England and Wales – and 
particularly which offences it might cover - there is no reason in theory or 
practice why such a system could not be successfully established in the adult 
criminal courts of England and Wales.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Emotions have assumed centre stage in various legal and criminological 
discourses including procedural justice, therapeutic jurisprudence, restorative 
justice, transitional justice as well as conflict resolution and peace building.146 
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Scholars and practitioners in these areas acknowledge significant value 
placed on the role of emotions, and the processes put in place to elicit them. 
Yet despite the rapid expansion of these concepts, emotions are still regarded 
with suspicion. The vast majority of sentencing decisions remain within the 
preserve of the formal legal system and are characterised by formality, legality 
and a closed system of communication147 dominated by legal professionals. 
All this takes place against a normative framework orientated towards 
retrbiutivism (albeit slightly mottled with occasional allusions to deterrence, 
incapacitation, rehabilitation and reparation).  
 
Emotions ex post facto are largely deemed an irrelevant factor for pure 
retributivists,148 and such a narrow focus has led to the social causes of and 
solutions to conflict being sidelined in discussions concerning how both theory 
and practice might move forwards. Still, as Bandes has contended, if the 
lawyers have not been persuaded by the encroachment of emotion, they have 
certainly felt impelled to respond.149 As this special edition attests, the place of 
emotion within law is well and truly established as a key theme within legal 
discourse. 
 
Undoubtedly some relatively recent initiatives, such as the advent of 
sentencing guidelines and victim impact statements, have increased the flow 
of emotional information to the court. However, the potential of emotions to 
enrich our justice system has been simultaneously thwarted by the reluctance 
of policymakers and practitioners to consider the wider questions concerning 
how sentencing might be improved by affording a more central role to 
emotional narratives and the need for deliberative interactions between 
victims and offenders. As it stands, the sentencing system of England and 
Wales affords scant attention to the emotions of criminal offenders and 
victims. Whilst, in the longer term, a considerable amount of theoretical and 
practical work needs to be done in developing and refining our understanding 
of emotions – and their precise relationship to the justice system – there are 
some steps that can be taken in the interim to make criminal sentencing more 
responsive to human emotions. Our hope is that a timely injection of 
emotional intelligence may trigger a broader realisation that criminal 
sentencing ought to perform a wider function than the mere retribution of 
wrongs. 
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